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taken in the great majority of jurisdictions where it is held that the con-
clusion of the governor must stand unless clearly erroneous. 20 This holding
seems to be eminently fair and sensible, allowing the court to rectify obvious
mistakes and review cases involving bad faith, but at the same time attach-
ing due weight to the executives' determinations.
In the instant case there was evidence that the date of the alleged crime
was at a different time than that charged in the indictment. Since this evi-
dence was satisfactory to the governor and his action not contrary to law,
the court very properly refused to reverse his decision.
J. L. A.
EMINENT DOMAIN - TITLE AND RIGHT OF POSSESSION BEFORE ACTUAL
COPENSATION-[Federal].-In the recent case of Hessel v. A. Smith & Co.1
a landowner sought an injunction to restrain a contractor from proceeding
to erect a government building, on the ground that the statute under which
the land had been acquired from the plaintiff was unconstitutional. The
statute,2 which provided that in proceedings by the United States to con-
demn land, the title and right of possession should vest in the United States
on the filing of a "Declaration of Taking" and the deposit in court of the
amount of estimated compensation, was held constitutional against the claim
that it violated the 5th Amendment.
It is well settled that the government may constitutionally take posses-
sion of privately-owned land prior to conclusion of condemnation proceed-
ings, even in the absence of express statutory authority, provided adequate
provision is made for ultimate payment of just compensation to the land-
owner.3 The procedure approved by the court in the earlier cases, however,
has been criticized as not adequately protecting the rights of the property
owner.
The mere right to have the compensation judicially determined subse-
quently to the taking with the ultimate award insured by the pledge of
to fulfill the functions of an appeal or writ of error.'0 A middle ground is
19. People v. Hazard, 361 Ill. 60, 196 N. E. 827 (1935) ; In re Halderman,
119 A. 735 (Pa. 1923) ; In re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70, 13 S. Ct. 793 (1893).
Habeas Corpus is not the proper proceeding to try the question as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Munsey v. Clough, supra, note 8; State
ex rel Cooney v. Hoffmeister, 80 S. W. (2d) 195 (Mo. 1935).
20. Munsey v. Clough, supra, note 8; Hogan v. O'Neill, supra, note 9;
Keeton v. Gaiser, supra, note 8. Governor's determination as to the suffi-
ciency of the sworn evidence that the party charged is a fugitive from jus-
tice is subject to judicial review. Drumm v. Penderson et al., 259 N. W. 208(Iowa 1935).
1. 3 U. S. Law Week 1201 (D. C. E. D. Ill., June 30, 1936).
2. 46 Stat. 1421, 40 U. S. C. A. sec. 258 (1931).
3. Cherokee Nation v. The Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 10
S. Ct. 965, 34 L. ed. 295 (1890); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 40 S. Ct..
63, 64 L. ed. 135 (1919); in re Condemnation for Improvement of Rouge
River, 266 Fed. 105 (D. C. Mich., 1920); Backus v. Fort Street Union De-
pot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 18 S. Ct. 445, 42 L. ed. 853 (1897).
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public faith, has been held adequate, without regard to uncompensated dep-
rivation during the potentially long period of litigation against the gov-
ernment. 4 Furthermore, under the procedure permitted by the earlier cases,
the property owner always ran the risk of having his land returned with-
out any allowance being made for oftentimes important consequential dam-
ages, if the governmental agency which appropriated the land acted without
authority5 or if the government decided to abandon the condemnation pro-
ceedings.6 As a result, one court warned that the "doctrine goes to the verge
of what can be sanctioned without destroying the essential right of the
citizen" to just compensation for his property.7
The statute in the principal case, however, not only required that a de-
posit be made in court before the taking, but made the money available to
the property owner. It also provided that the head of the department
instituting the proceedings file an opinion with the deposit to the effect that
in his opinion the ultimate award would not be greater than the amount
deposited.9 The property owner may contend for a larger sum even though
he applies to the court for the use of the sum deposited. If the landowner
does not withdraw the money deposited before final judgment, the statute
provides for the payment of interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date
of taking of the land.1 The statute also provides that the taking of title
irrevocably commits the United States to the payment of the ultimate
award."
The theoretical point that the government cannot acquire title, as distin-
guished from possession, prior to the payment of full compensation, would
seem to have little validity. Practical considerations make the former alter-
native preferable to the latter. It precludes the possibility of an abandon-
ment by the government, and definitely removes the liability from the land
owner to pay the state taxes, for which he might be held as long as he re-
tains the title.12
4. U. S. v. O'Neill, 198 Fed. 677, 683 (D. C. D. Colo., 1912) ; Adirondack
Ry. Co. v. People, 175 U. S. 335, 349, 20 S. Ct. 460, 44 L. ed. 492, 500
(1899); Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290, 306, 32 S. Ct. 448, 56 L. Ed. 771
(1912) ; the responsibility of a city which may be enforced in the courts,
held equivalent to prior compensation. In re Mayor, 99 N. Y. 569, 2 N. E.
642 (1885); landowner's right left to depend on the outcome of litigation
with a third party which had reasonable grounds for disputing its liability,
Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491, 23 S. Ct. 440, 47 L. ed. 562 (1902).
5. Hooe v. United States, 218 U. S. 322, 31 S. Ct. 85, 54 L. ed. 1055, 1060
(1910).
6. Lewis, Emizet Domain (1st ed. 1888) sec. 655; Ford v. Park Com'rs,
148 Ia. 1, 126 N. W. 1030; Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 940 (1910).
7. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Garland, 25 Fed. 521, 529 (C. C. D. Md.,
1885).
8. (1931) 46 Stat. 1421, c. 307, sec. 1; 40 U. S. C. A. sec. 258a.
9. (1931) 46 Stat. 1422, c. 307, sec. 5; 40 U. S. C. A. sec. 258e.
10. (1931) 46 Stat. 1421, c. 307, sec. 1; 40 U. S. C. A. sec. 258a.
11. (1931) 46 Stat. 1422, c. 307, see. 3; 40 U. S. C. A. see. 258c.
12. Jasper Land & Improvement Co. v. Kansas City, 293 Mo. 674, 293
S. W. 864 (1922); Buckhout v. City of New York 82 App. Div. 218, 81
N. Y. S. 723 (1903).
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Although the obiter dictum in an early Supreme Court case13 would seem
to create precedent for holding unconstitutional any statute which permits
title to pass before the payment of full compensation, the opinions in two
other cases14 would provide adequate and reliable precedent for the deci-
sion of the principal case.
From the practical as well as the strictly legal standpoint, therefore, it
is submitted that the court's decision in Hessel v. A. Smith & Co. might
safely be relied upon in future cases involving the same point.
F. L. K.
LEASE-GOLD CLAUSE-PAYMENT-[Federal].-In the case of Emery
Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams' the plaintiff was lessee under a
99-year lease2 providing for payment of rent, after the seventh year of the
lease, in quarterly installments of 139,320 grains of "pure unalloyed gold,"
the lessor having the right to demand, in lieu of such gold payment, the sum
of $6,000. Gold payments were subsequently rendered illegal by Resolution
of Congress s and impossible by Executive Order requiring the surrender of
gold to the Government. 4 The lessor insisted that the lessee make payments
of $10,158.755 in currency, which he claimed to be the true currency equiva-
lent of the gold specified. The lessee made such payments under protest and
sued for the return of the excess of each payment( above $6,000. The lessor
asked in a cross-bill for forfeiture of the lease. The court found against
the lessee, holding that the lease required payment of $10,158.75 as the value
of the gold at the time of payment. It further said that the lessor was not
entitled to forfeiture of the lease and that the Joint Resolution of Congress
did not apply to the lease in question.
Congress, in its Joint Resolution,7 while it stated that "Every provision
contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give
13. Garrison v. City of New York, 21 Wall. 196, 204, 22 L. ed. 612 (1874).
14. Crowner v. Watertown & R. R. Co., 9 How. Pr. 457 (N. Y., 1854);
Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 16 S. Ct. 43, 40 L. ed. 188, 199 (1895).
1. 15 F. Supp. 938 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1936).
2. The lease in question was executed April 11, 1890.
3. 48 Stat. 113, 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 463 (June 5, 1933).
4. Executive Order, No. 6260, 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 95 note (Aug. 28,
1933) ; see also 48 Stat. 1, 12 U. S. C. A. secs. 95, 95a.
5. This figure may be arrived at as follows: (1) By dividing 139,320, the
number of grains specified in the lease, by 13.71428, the number of grains
of pure gold in the now-devalued dollar; (2) By dividing 139,320 by 480 to
obtain the number of ounces in the number of grains specified and multiply-
ing by $35.00, the price of newly-mined gold. See World Almanac (1936)
285; Bakewell, Past and Present Facts about Money in the United States(1936) 117-120; Warren and Pearson, Gold and Prices (1935) 153-175;
Proclamation of Jan. 31, 1934, reducing the weight of the gold dollar, 48
Stat. 1730, 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 821 note; 48 Stat. 51, 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 821
and note; Gold Reserve Act, 48 Stat. 337, 342, 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 821 (1934).
6. Payments in question are those of Jan. 1, April 1, July 1, and Oct. 1,
1934, and Jan. 1, 1935.
7. 48 Stat. 113, 31 U. S. C. A. see. 463 (June 5, 1933).
Washington University Open Scholarship
